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THE IDENTITY OF 'SUMATRA' IN HISTORY 
Anthony R e i d (Australian National University) 
Any endeavours such as the 1981 Conference on 'North Sumatra', 
and the present book, raise questions about the most fruitful 
and appropriate boundaries for scholarly enquiry. Although 
two of my own books (1969; 1979) are premised on a quite 
different definition of 'North Sumatra' - including Aceh but 
excluding Tapanuli - I would be the first to concede that the 
Hamburg Conference did show the value of looking at the present 
(since 1956) province of North Sumatra as a distinct unit. 
Behind this question of definition, however, there lies an older 
and deeper question, whether Sumatra as a whole should be 
distinguished as a field of enquiry. 
Since William Marsden (1783; 1811) and his less distinguished 
contemporaries Eschels-Kroon (1781) and Radermacher (1781) 
published their books within three years, there has been a 
succession of impressive scholarly monuments to the proposition 
that Sumatra is a unit - notably Lekkerkerker (1916), Collet 
(1925), and Loeb (1935). More recently (1971) the Sumatra 
Research Bulletin aimed to establish a permanent forum for the 
coherent study of 'one of the most important culture areas of 
island Southeast Asia'. It was the birth of that admirable 
journal which set my own thoughts moving on the present topic, 
although its death four years later led me to wonder whether the 
question had already been decided in the negative. The degree of 
objective unity in the language, culture, mythology or economy 
of Sumatra has not yet been adequately researched, and is too 
ambitious a subject for this paper. Since scholarship often 
follows political reality, however (though the reverse process 
also occurs, as we shall see below), it may be of interest to 
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trace the self-identification of Sumatrans themselves during 
their recent history. 
Geography has always made it difficult for Sumatra to 
manifest a single identity, at least as long as the most 
effective communication was by sea. The Straits of Malacca 
united the broad rivers of the east coast with the Malay 
Peninsula and beyond, as the Sunda Straits united the south with 
Java. The great historical achievements of the people of 
Sumatra, therefore, never remained exclusively Sumatran. 
Perversely, even some of the names by which Sumatra first 
appeared on the historical stage - Melayu ('in the 
Nagarakertagama) and Java (in many Arab sources, including Ibn 
Battutah) - have been appropriated by Sumatra's neighbours. 
There are two major historical achievements, in particular, 
which might have been expected to form the basis for a Sumatran 
cultural nationalism in modern times. Firstly> the Sri Vijaya 
empire, centred in Palembang and Jambi, was supreme over all the 
coastal ports of Sumatra as well as the Malay Peninsula for 
most of the period from the 7th to the 13th centuries - by far 
the longest-lived of Indonesia's great powers. 
Secondly the Malay language and its literature, now the 
official language of four countries, was nurtured primarily if 
not exclusively in a succession of Sumatran centres - ·sri 
Vijaya, Samudra-Pasai, Aceh, Palembang, Riau-Lingga - and was 
spoken and read throughout the island. It was the very success 
of this language in becoming first the lingua franca of the 
Archipelago and then the language of nationalism which 
prevented it being seen as 'the language of Sumatra' (cf. 
Roolvink, 1975). 
If we compare the career of Sri Vijaya with that of Majapahit 
in nationalist historiography (Reid & Marr, 1979, pp. 171-85, 
287-9), it becomes clear that the former has been at a 
disadvantage. Both empires of the past had been largely 
forgotten by the 19th century, though retaining an indistinct 
aura of a vanished greatness. Because Dutch scholarship was 
concentrated on Java, Brandes' editions of the Pararaton and 
the Naqarakertaqama provided the basis, at least by the time 
of Fruin-Mees 1 popular Geschiedenis van Java (1919), for 
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incorporating a glorious Majapahit into the textbook view of 
Javanese, hence Indonesian, history. By contrast Dutch 
scholarship on Sumatra was modest and uncoordinated. Most of 
the more ambitious writing on Sumatra was always by non-Dutch 
scholars, and it was two Frenchmen, Goedes (1918) and Ferrand 
(1922), who finally established the claims of Sri Vijaya to a 
former greatness. The impact of their findings on Sumatrans was 
delayed not only by being relatively inaccessible in French 
(until incorporated into Dutch textbooks, notably by Krom in the 
1930s), but also because the name selected by the scholars, 
'Sri Vijaya', had no popular association at all. The legendary 
greatness of a past Sumatran kingdom was linked in the popular 
mind with 'Andalas' and 'Pulo Percha', both apparently kingdoms 
in the headwaters of the Musi or Batang Hari rivers, which must 
have flourished during the long process by which the aura of Sri 
Vijaya moved upriver until it eventually settled on the Yang di 
Pertuan Sakti of Minangkabau, at Pagarruyung (for Andalas see 
Brown, 1955, pp. 24-5; Pires, 1944, pp. 136, 155, 159-60; for 
Pulo Percha see Hill, 196~, pp. 103, 170-1; Marsden, 1811, p. 
339n.). Even today there appears to be no Indonesian work on Sri 
Vij aya. 
On the other hand, once the centre of British interest in 
Southeast Asia moved from Sumatra to Malaya {in 1824 at the 
latest), there were no more works like that of Marsden. British 
scholarship increasingly tended to associate the heritage of Sri 
Vijaya and the achievements of the Malay language with the Malay 
peninsula, notably Singapore (Tumasek) and Malacca - a tradition 
which laid a natural basis for Malayan cultural nationalism 
rather than Sumatran. 
Nineteenth century writers are probably correct in reporting 
that Sumatra was then 'without a name familiar to the 
inhabitants' (Crawfurd, 1856, p. 413). As an experienced French 
traveller explained, 
When one asks a native of Sumatra what name he gives 
his island, one has considerable difficulty making 
oneself understood. He knows the islands, many of 
them, around him, but Sumatra, with its innumerable 
countries, its diverse races, its numerous languages, 
is a world for him. (Brau de St. Pol Lias, 1891, pp. 
74-5) 
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For navigators from elsewhere, on the other hand, the name of 
the whole was taken from the name of a part - in particular from 
the strongest kingdom of the northwestern corner which was the 
first landfall for Arabs, Indians, and Europeans. Lamri (Lamuri, 
Lambri or Ramni), near present Banda Aceh, gave its name to the 
whole island for many Arab geographers of the 10th-13th 
centuries, whereas the rising power of Samudra (or Pasai), near 
modern Lhokseumawe, had begun to popularise the modern name by 
the late 14th century {e.g. Nicolo de Conti, Ludovico de 
Varthema). It is possible, however, as Krom (1941, pp. 22-5) has 
argued, that the success of Samudra/Sumatra as the name for the 
whole island also owed something to the older Sanskrit term 
Suwarnabhumi ('Gold-land') occasionally applied to Sumatra, 
notably by a Singasari inscription of 1286. 
THE HERITAGE OF SRI VIJAYA 
The inhabitants of the island only began to call it Sumatra as 
a result of European influence, for the most part in this 
century. It was not the north but the centre of the island which 
carried powerful associations for most of them. These 
associations must originate with the mantle of Sri Vijaya. The 
Raja Alam or Yang di Pertuan Sakti of Pagarruyung, despite 
having very little effective power even within Minangkabau 
itself, was widely believed to have semi-divine powers as one 
of the three heirs, along with China and Rum (Constantinople/ 
Turkey), of the world ruler Alexander the Great. At least twice a 
war-leader was able to arouse widespread support in Sumatra on 
the basis of a real or alleged connection with the dynasty of 
Pagarruyung. In the 1680s Ahmad Shah ibn Iskandar obtained 
support from the rulers of Palembang and Jambi, and from many 
chiefs in the Lampung and Bengkulen regions, for his intended 
'holy war' against the Dutch (Kathirithamby-Nells, 1970, pp. 
48-63; Marsden, 1811, p. 337). A generation later, in 1717-18, 
Raja Kecil used a similar claim to be a prince from Pagarruyung 
to good effect in seizing the thrones of Siak and Riau (Andaya, 
1975, pp. 250-314). 
Even the Bataks, relatively more isolated in their mountain 
valleys, appear to have shared this reverence. According to 
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Marsden (1811, pp. 376-7), 
Notwithstanding the independent spirit of the Battas 
... they have a superstitious veneration for the 
Sultan of Menangkabau, and shew blind submission to 
his relations and emissaries, real or pretended, 
when such appear among them for the purposes of 
levying contributions: ... they think that their 
affairs would never prosper, that their padi would 
be blighted, and their buffaloes die: that they would 
remain under a kind of spell, for offending these 
sacred messengers. 
This remote but attractive Minangkabau supremacy appears to 
have been ended by the militant expansionism of the Padris in 
the first three decades of the 19th century. These Islamic 
reformers may have sought to unite the whole of Sumatra on an 
Islamic base, with the central valleys of Central and North 
Sumatra rather than the coastal cities as the power centres (I 
owe this point to Christine Dobbin). Their aggessive tactics in 
South Tapanuli, however, had the opposite effect, changing the 
sacred but remote image of Minangkabau into a hostile and 
threatening one similar to the long-standing image of Aceh. A 
recent Batak author (Sangti, 1977, pp. 24-6) has seen the Fadri 
offensive as a crucial watershed which divided the Bataks from 
each other as well from the Minangkabau. The subsequent adoption 
of Christianity by the Toba Batak can be seen as a response to 
this threat to Toba identity. 
By the end of the 19th Century, therefore, there was little 
recollection of any common Sumatran identity or loyalty. Even 
the anti-Dutch hopes kindled by the Aceh War failed to evoke any 
such response except among a small group of followers of 
Singamangaraja XII in the 1880s. The Acehnese leaders wrote to 
Minangkabau and Batak chiefs for support in 1873, but since 
their letters were entrusted to a Dutch spy they were unlikely 
to have reached their destination. Envoys were more successful 
among the neighbouring Gayo and Karo people, though the envoys 
to Karo were eventually killed there in 1874 1 perhaps because of 
the traditional distrust of Acehnese motives referred to by 
Singarimbun (1975, p. 6; also Reid, 1969, p. 153). 
INTERNAL COMMUNICATION 
If there was an economic and communications centre for Sumatra 
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in the 19th Century, it was paradoxically in the British 
settlements of Penang and Singapore. Since it was there that the 
trade of Sumatra was concentrated, it was only there that 
Sumatrans from different ends of the island were likely to meet. 
For the Acehnese, for example, Snouk Hurgronje argued in 1893 
'Penang is the gateway to the world; yes, the world itself' 
(cited Reid, 1969, p. 269}. If Acehnese used the word pulo 
(island) without further qualification, it meant not Sumatra but 
Penang. 
This same problem dogged the two European powers which, 
seeing Sumatra as a geographical expressinn on a map, appointed 
consuls to it in the 19th Century. The French based their 
Sumatra consul at Padang, the principal Dutch post, in the 
period 1856-65, and the British based theirs at Uleelheue, the 
port which supplied the Dutch forces in Aceh, in 1883-5. Both 
proved 'a complete failure', since the comm'erce they were meant 
to serve had flourished only by avoiding these centres of Dutch 
power and trading at scores of tiny independent ports along the 
Sumatran coast (ibid., pp. 198-201 ). 
The Dutch in the 19th Century knew at least two Sumatras 
the West Coast and the East Coast - with Palembang as something 
else again, a little more nearly part of Java. Their earliest 
newspapers proclaimed themselves Sumatran, but whereas the 
Sumatra Post (Medan, 1889-) in practice circulated among the 
planters of East Sumatra, the Sumatra Bode (Padang 1893-) was 
limited to the West Coast. 
Java was physically united by a trunk railway in 1894, 
speeding up the long-standing network of the post roads. By 
contrast railway-building in Sumatra laboured to unite not the 
whole island, but each of the three distinct regions mentioned 
above. The northern Sumatra network, begun at different ends in 
the 1880s, finally joined Aceh with Medan and Belawan only in 
1916. Similarly in the South, the Lampung line and the Palembang 
-Lahat line joined in 1927. Meanwhile a third, smaller network 
developed in West Sumatra from the 1880s. These three distinct 
networks were never linked, and it was left to road transport 
finally to accomplish the economic unification of the island. The 
major boom in road building and in vehicle import to Sumatra 
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coincided with the high rubber prices of the mid-1920s. The 
number of trucks and buses imported to Sumatra leaped from 94 in 
1924 to 1172 in 1926, while the number of private cars rose in 
the same period from 539 to 3059. Relative to population, the 
motor vehicle was playing a larger role in Sumatra than in Java, 
and at last breaking down the isolation of the island 1 s regions 
from each other. Although the first 1 sumatra Highway' 
(longitudinalen weg) was planned in 1916, however, the last 
bridge linking the southern networks to those of the north and 
centre was only completed in 1938. It was not a pure coincidence 
that Sumatra's decade as an autonomous political/administrative 
unit also began in 1938, and was therefore enacted at a period 
when internal communication was easier than at any time before 
or since. During the 1940s Sumatran officials constantly toured 
the island by car, something only a very brave and patient man 
would have done in the 1950s and '60s. 
1 SUMATRAN NATIONALISM' 
The heyday of 'Sumatran nationalism' occurred earlier, however -
two decades before the structural basis of unity had been laid 
by this road network. Like so many other Indonesian movements, 
it began in the Dutch-language school systems, especially the 
STOVIA Medical School in Batavia. This elite school, which 
educated the ablest sons of the various Indonesian regions and 
peoples,· had given birth to Budi Otomo and to Jong Java, and it 
was not surprising that the Sumatran minority of students felt 
the need of their own vehicle for expressing the common striving 
for unity and progress. In December 1917 the Jong Sumatranen 
Bond (JSB) was formed 'for Sumatran young people who are 
undergoing secondary or vocational education', with the primary 
aim 'to strengthen the bond between studying Sumatran youth, by 
driving out all racial feelings (rassenwaan) ... and by posing 
to each member the inescapable demand that he call himself a 
Sumatran' (Jong-Sumatra 1918). Its first chairman, the Asahan 
(East Sumatra) prince Tengku Mansur, emphasized in his opening 
speech that Sumatrans would continue to be disregarded until 
they were united. Nevertheless cooperation was necessary not 
only among Sumatrans but also with the other ethnic groups of 
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the Indies. The second chairman, Amir, was still more emphatic 
in rejecting the 'chauvinism' of some who dreamed of separating 
1 an absolute-Sumatran state and nation' from the Indies bond 
(JSB 1922, p. 19). As Lance Castles has pointed out (1972, P· 
175), these Sumatran nationalists spoke 'the language ... of 
unity, not division; ... they really had no very cogent reasons 
why working together should be limited to Sumatra 1 • Sumatran 
nationalism was a stage in the movement towards Indonesian 
nationalism rather than a contradiction of it (as Java 
nationalism sometimes was, with its deeper cultural 
associations). 
It was not surprising that the sense of Sumatran unity was 
first felt by students in Batavia, conscious of being 
outnumbered in an alien environment. However JSB initiative 
evoked a rapid response in Sumatra itself. Branches of the JSB 
were established in Bukittinggi and Padang';-'(where Hatta was an 
enthusiastic leader) in January 1918, and in Medan the following 
May. More remarkably, the popular political movements of West 
Sumatra and Tapanuli went through a striking period of pan-
Sumatran enthusiasm between 1918 and 1922. Newspapers like 
Tiahaia Sumatra, Sinar Sumatra, and Sumatra Berqerak were 
founded, and unity congresses pledged their faith in Sumatra as 
'the island of the future'. 
The catalysts of the Sumatran unity conferences were young 
political activists who happened to have a foot in more than one 
ethnic group. Xarim M.S. (the later leader of the Sumatran PKI) 
was a Minangkabau who had grown up between Aceh and East 
Sumatra; Manullang was a fiery Toba Batak, who as leader of the 
radical Hatopan Kristen Batak frequently cooperated with the 
Muslim southern Bataks of Sarekat Islam; and the Angkola Batak 
journalists Abdulmanap and Parada Harahap both worked with the 
Sibolga radical newspaper Hindia Sepakat, which drew its readers 
from Aceh, Tapanuli and Nest Sumatra. They staged two 
preliminary unity congresses, at Sibolga and Padang respectively, 
in the last two months of 1921, campaigning among other things 
for the removal of the headquarters of the Sarekat Sumatra from 
Batavia (where it acted primarily as a lobby for the Hinangkabau 
Volksraad members, Abdul Rivai and Abdul Muis) to Sumatra itself 
-32-
IDENTITY 
(IPO 1921, pp. 528-32 1 568-71 ). 
The high point of this Sumatra Unity movement was a well-
attended conference in Padang in July 1922, with Manullang as 
chairman and Xarim as secretary. The most active political 
parties in Sumatra at the time, Sarekat Islam and N.I.P. (the 
former Indische Partij), as well as many local associations in 
West Sumatra, Tapanuli, East Sumatra and Aceh, sent delegates to 
the conference. Its radical tone was expressed in a number of 
resolutions, including one calling for 'a speedy grant of 
autonomy to Sumatra, because Sumatra hopes for a liberation of 
the Indies from the tutelage of the Netherlands' (IPO, 1922, II, 
pp. 42-4; Abdullah, 1971, p. 31). Thereafter, however, the 
movement declined very rapidly. One reason was the radicalism 
which brought imprisonment to some of the activists and which 
frightened some established leaders. Another was the difficulty 
1n agreeing to a headquarters or a leadership which was truly 
representative. More important still was the fact that the more 
reforms were demanded of the Dutch government, the more the 
community of interest with nationalist organizations throughout 
the Indies became apparent. 
Like most of the politicians involved in the Sumatra unity 
movement, the JSB also moved increasingly into the mainstream of 
Indonesian nationalism. From 1926 it attended a series of 
national youth conferences, and it had lost any real dynamic of 
its own long before it fused into Pemuda Indonesia in 1931. One 
of the factors which delayed this fusion was the splitting away 
of a Jong Batak organization in 1926. The Toba Batak students 
had decided that they would develop their own relationship with 
Indonesian nationalism as Bataks, rather than through the 
mediation of what they saw (with some justification) as a 
Minangkabau-dominated organization. In the more intense spirit 
of nationalism after 1926 that seemed for many others the obvious 
path to take. 
A sceptic might reasonably point out that the Dutch took up 
the question of Sumatran autonomy only once they were quite sure 
that Indonesian political leaders had laid it down. By 1930 the 
locus of popular politics was firmly that of Indonesian 
nationalism, and it was the colonial government which moved 
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cumbrously towards establishing a single 'Province' of Sumatra 
as one of six large units for the colony. Although the 
government now said that it wanted to encourage the feelings of 
'Sumatraness' which it discerned (van der Harst, 1945, pp. 
46-8), nothing was done to this end. The creation of the 
province, legislated in 1936 and made effective in 1938, was 
entirely a matter of reorganizing administrative functions. 
Nothing was done to establish any representative element - even 
to the extent of the powerless provincial councils in Java. As 
with every discussion of Sumatran unity, the most difficult 
question in these colonial debates was f.hat of the capital. 
Padang was first chosen, and Palembang was considered, but 
eventually it was at Medan that the first Governor of Sumatra 
established his residence and offices (ibid., pp. 70-2). The 
choice emphasized the primacy of European commercial and 
,, 
administrative interests. 
SUMATRA IN ISOLATION, 1943-5 
As is well known, the Japanese occupation began with a complete 
denial of Indonesian unity. Instead Sumatra and Malaya were 
regarded as a unit, 'the nuclear zone of the Empire's plans for 
the Southern Area', and administered as such by the Japanese 
25th Army. The capital of this new unit was Syonan (Singapore), 
reflecting the economic realities of the 19th Century better 
than the political and cultural ones of the 20th. This 
experiment broke down mainly as a result of increasing Japanese 
communications difficulties between islands, but also because 
the legal and political systems on the two sides of the Straits 
were by now far apart. In May 1943 the link with Malaya was 
broken, and the 25th Army took charge of Sumatra alone. Now the 
capital was shifted to Bukittinggi, not so much in deference to 
the 'cultural centre' of Sumatra, as some Minangkabaus liked to 
claim, as out of strategic calculations. 
The slogan favoured by the 25th Army thereafter was 'Sumatera 
Baru' - New Sumatra. All links between Indonesians in Sumatra 
and those in other islands were cut, and no talk of Indonesian 
nationalism was allowed. Until the last moment, however, the 
Japanese did virtually nothing to develop a positive Sumatran 
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identity to fill this gap. The administration was very 
decentralized, with each residency (shu) having to develop its 
own economy and its own consultative bodies. Only in a few 
pan-Sumatran specialist schools and a couple of all-Sumatra 
delegations to Japan could Sumatrans from different 
residencies gather to develop a common strategy or feeling. It 
cannot have helped encourage a Sumatran political leadership 
when the outspoken leader of the all-Sumatra delegation to Japan 
in October 1943, T.M. Hasan (of Glumpang Payung, Aceh), was 
executed by the Kenpeitai less than a year later. 
Only in the last four months of the Occupation did the 25th 
Army leadership bestir itself at all to develop a pan-Sumatran 
leadership, and then only as a way of resisting unwelcome 
pressure from Tokyo to move towards Indonesian independence. On 
24 March 1945 it was announced that a Sumatran Central Advisory 
Council (Chuo Sangi In) would be set up -- almost two years 
after its Java equivalent. At the end of May the Gunseikanbu 
(Military Administration) in Bukittinggi announced its choice of 
leaders for this council. The chairman would be Engku Mohammad 
Sjafei, the Minangkabau educational reformer who had become the 
most prominent politician in West Sumatra under the Japanese. 
Its secretary was another Minangkabau, Djamaluddin Adinegoro, 
probably the leading Indonesian journalist of his day. He was 
moved from Medan to Bukittinggi to take up his duties. The two 
vice-chairmen were Teuku Njak Arif and Mr Abdul Abbas, chairman 
of the representative councils in Aceh and Lampung respectively. 
During June and July these men began to be promoted in the 
Japanese controlled press as the empat serangkai (four-in-one) 
of Sumatra, comparable to the better-known quadrumvirate in 
Java (Reid, 1971, pp. 27-8). 
The single meeting of the Sumatra Central Advisory Council, 
for 5 days ending 2 July 1945, was of considerable significance 
as the first ever conference representing all major social and 
political forces in Sumatra. It made a number of demands for 
rapid development of popular, military, and educational bodies 
at Sumatran level, and it undoubtedly helped to legitimize for 
the first time a genuine Sumatran leadership in which Dr A.K. 
Gani, a Minangkabau politician resident in Palembang, and the 
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Toba Batak leader Dr Ferdinand Lumbantobing joined the empat 
serangkai above. The spirit of the meeting appeared to favour a 
stronger and more self-governing Sumatra, but to oppose the 25th 
Army's attempts to separate the island altogether from the 
independent Indonesia decided upon by Tokyo. 
THE SUMATRAN PROVINCE OF THE INDONESIAN REPUBLIC 
Despite the crudeness and belatedness with which the 25th Army 
went about preparing an autonomous Sumatra, the Sumatra 
government would have amounted to something had these 
preparations been build upon the Republic which followed. But 
for reasons which are still unclear, the three delegates of 
Sumatra sent to the independence preparation meetings in Jakarta 
in mid-August 1945 were not the leaders who had been groomed in 
Bukittinggi. Instead the Japanese sent Mr Abas from Lampung, and 
two Medan intellectuals who had played li{tle part in the 
Sumatran preparations, Dr M. Amir (the guiding light of JSB in 
its most flourishing years) and Mr T. Hasan. In the hasty 
arrangements after the independence proclamation in Jakarta, Dr 
Amir was able to ensure that Medan, not Bukittinggi, was 
designated the capital of the Republican Province of Sumatra, and 
that the little-known Acehnese, Mr Hasan, was appointed as 
Governor. Dr Amir, a non-active member of Sukarno's first 
cabinet, was named Deputy Governor of Sumatra in December. 
Neither West Sumatra nor Palembang was impressed with the 
decisions made in Jakarta, nor with the leadership provided by 
Hasan and Amir in Medan. In the first months of independence 
Sjafei and Adinegoro in West Sumatra and Dr Gani in Palembang 
both issued proclamations on behalf of Sumatra as a whole, 
leaving no doubt of their impatience at the slowness of Hasan to 
do anything to set up a Republican Government. Their claims to 
rival leadership were given some legitimation by Gani 1 s 
appointment to represent the PNI State Party and later the 
Republican Army in Sumatra, and by Adinegoro's to represent the 
Republican Information Ministry in Sumatra. 
In short, the all-Sumatra leadership of the Republic had very 
little support in the island as a whole. In this it contrasted 
with the Japanese-designated leaders in each Residency of 
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Sumatra (except East Sumatra, where there was none), who were 
all able to assume control fairly smoothly after independence. 
It was an accident which turned out extremely fortunate for the 
eventual unity of Indonesia that no strong Sumatran leadership 
had been developed by the Japanese and confirmed by the Republic 
(Reid, 1971). 
Hasan and Amir, particularly the latter, did appear to seek 
'autonomy concerning internal and external affairs' for Sumatra 
(Amir, cited ibid., p. 41 ). After a visit to Java in December 
1945 Amir gave a press conference declaring that 'the government 
of the Republic in Java considers Sumatra as being politically 
and economically independent of Java, and at liberty to take any 
action which does not run counter to the interests of the 
Republic' (WIS 13, WO 172/9893). He appears to have been 
thinking of a loose Indonesian confederation. However he was 
forced to repudiate statements such as these very quickly by 
youth activists (pemuda) who were suspicious of any signs of 
separatism on the part of the older generation. Particularly 
during the first half of 1946 pemuda organizations in East 
Sumatra regularly intimidated the official Republican 
leadership, and denied it of much real power. Dr Amir himself 
was so dismayed by his own ineffectiveness that he defected to 
the Allies in April 1946, complaining 'There is not the least 
unity in Sumatra -- There is not one instrument of authority 1 
(cited Reid, 1979, p. 244). 
In fact an all-Sumatran government was beginning to assume 
some substance at about this time, but more as a link between 
the Residencies and Jogjakarta than as an independent power 
centre. Stirred by reports of chaos in Sumatra, particularly 
East Sumatra, the first Central Government delegation toured the 
island in April led by Amir Sjarifuddin. The ministers attended 
the first meeting of the all-Sumatra representative council 
(KNI) in Bukittinggi, which helped provide some legitimacy for 
Hasan as Governor, and elected a working committee to assist 
him. In June and July the members of this working committee 
began to converge in Pematang Siantar, which had been selected 
as the new Sumatran capital to replace Allied-dominated Medan. 
Heads of various all-Sumatra Departments were also appointed to 
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reside there. Thereafter missions from Jogjakarta were repeated 
regularly in an attempt to strengthen the Republican position by 
working through this all-Sumatra government. Since the Dutch 
government had announced in early May that it could not 
recognize Republican claims over Sumatra in view of the chaos 
reigning there, it became a high priority of the Republic to 
demonstrate stability and control. Vice-President Hatta himself 
began a tour of Sumatra with Governor Hasan in June 1947, and 
remained there throughout the first Dutch military action. 
While Jogjakarta attempted to strengthen the weak Sumatra 
Province government, politicians within -Sumatra itself 
consistently demanded its abolition. For Central and South 
Sumatra the capital was far too remote, and even in the North 
pemuda groups took more notice of central government delegations 
than of the Sumatran governor. The plunder of the East Sumatran 
raj as and the lucrative smuggling trade to~' Singapore gave a 
smell of corruption to many levels of government in Republican 
Sumatra, so that a preference developed for government which was 
either close enough to be controlled, or remote enough {in Java) 
to be assumed guiltless. The first meeting of the Sumatran KNI 
began the process of devolution by deciding for three 
sub-governors, in North, Central and South Sumatra, to be 
responsible to the governor. These sub-governors had hardly 
begun to function, however, before they were overtaken by the 
Dutch military action and a shift to military zones (Daerah 
Militer). The military action also speeded the return of the 
Sumatran capital to Bukittinggi under Hatta's guidance (Van 
Langenberg, 1976, pp. 569, 667-8). 
The complete dismemberment of the Sumatran Province into 
three provinces of North, Central and South was proposed by the 
all-Sumatra assembly at its May 1947 meeting in Bukittinggi. 
Given the crisis caused by the Dutch military action, however, 
nothing was done to implement this until April 1948, when a law 
(UU 10 of 1948) was passed by the Republican parliament bringing 
an official end to Sumatra's decade as an administrative unit. 
Three provinces were established in Sumatra, each under a 
Governor assisted by an executive board elected by a 
representative assembly (DPR). Mr S.M. Amin, a lawyer of 
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Mandailing origin but Acehnese residence, became the first 
Governor of North Sumatra on 19 June 1948. Despite much debate 
between Tapanuli and Aceh over the site for the North Sumatran 
capital {given the Dutch occupation of most of East Sumatra), 
Amin remained at Kutaraja (Banda Aceh), (Republik Indonesia, 
1953, pp. 183-4). 
FEDERAL/DUTCH HOPES 
The Dutch strategy for outflanking the Republic through a 
federally constituted Indonesia had also involved from the 
beginning a pan-Sumatran entity of some sort. Dutch plans called 
for large states in Sumatra, Borneo, and Eastern Indonesia (the 
only one successfully created), each made up on an elaborate 
configuration of smaller autonomous ethnic units. As early as 
February 1947, however, a perceptive Dutch memorandum {Idenberg, 
27-ii-1947)acknowledged that the Dutch were powerless to woo 
Sumatra away from Java since it was precisely the common 
opposition to Dutch influence which drove the two islands 
together. Even were the anti-Dutch struggle to end, Idenberg 
conceded, 'it would in practice be very difficult to bring a 
government of its own into being in Sumatra which had the 
support of the Sumatran people' (ibid., p. 577). For none of the 
four major groupings in Sumatra was the idea of a strong 
Sumatran government really attractive. The South Sumatrans on 
the whole feared Minangkabau domination more than they feared 
Java; the Minangkabau, although seeing themselves as natural 
leaders of Sumatra in a general way, could not bring themselves 
to accept the legitimacy of any state structure or leadership; 
the Batak and the Acehnese, the other two groupings, could not 
be very enthusiastic about any political structure in which they 
were not dominant. All, in other words, 'would rather relate to 
the half-magical idea of an Indonesian Republic than to the much 
more real character of a Greater Sumatra in which they would 
have to accept the influence of other Sumatrans' (ibid. p. 582). 
The Director of General Affairs concluded that it would be 
extremely difficult to involve a Sumatran unit of any sort in a 
federal structure, in which Sumatra would pay most of the bills 
but Sumatrans would be outnumbered. 
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As soon as one comes to the substantial ordering of 
Indonesian relationships one comes up against 
contradictions, which are easier to resolve in a 
provisional sense through an emotional phenomenon 
like the Indonesian Republic than in an organized 
political structure (ibid., p. 584). 
The all-Sumatra conferences organized by the federalists in 1949 
seemed destined to fulfil this prophecy. Dr Tengku Mansur, the 
first JSB chairman, had become the head of the Dutch-backed 
State of East Sumatra (NST) in January 1948, governing the area 
which had been occupied by Dutch troops the previous year. He 
was predictably enthusiastic about a strong and united Sumatra, 
and he was well supported by his counterpart in the State of 
South Sumatra, Abdul Malik. On 29 March they succeeded in 
bringing together for a 'Muktamar Sumatera' in Medan, 84 
delegates from 16 regions. Only Aceh and Nias, neither of which 
had been occupied by Dutch troops in the 'Second Police Action', 
'" were unrepresented (Van Langenberg, 1976, pp. 765-76). 
Dr Mansur's opening speech was remarkably reminiscent of the 
emphasis of JSB, stressing unity rather than division. His 
metaphor for Sumatra was a pillar on which the great building of 
federal Indonesia had to rest. But 'a pillar which is built of 
stones will fall apart and lack strength we must work to 
provide the cement to bind those stones' (cited Republik 
Indonesia, 1953, p. 296). Yet the conference was unable to agree 
on anything more than an intention 'to create a Sumatra which is 
strong and united', and a decision to meet again (ibid., pp. 
322-4). Ethnic and regional rivalries dogged the whole 
conference, with most delegations more concerned to strengthen 
the autonomy of their respective regions than to sacrifice any 
powers to a Sumatran government. The second 'Muktamar Sumatera' 
did meet in Medan on 28 May, and opted for a 'provisional 
federation' in Sumatra as part of federal Indonesia. Yet only a 
week after this hesitant decision was taken it was torpedoed by 
the principal sponsor of the whole movement, the state of East 
Sumatra, whose assembly rejected NST participation in a Sumatran 
federation because this would comprise its own independence (Van 
Langenberg, 1976, p. 500). Even those who in principle believed 
in federalism, in other words, could not construct a Sumatran 
unit. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the long run the Republic found that even the smaller 
Provinces of North, Central and South Sumatra were too full of 
contradictions to stay together. Each split until provincial 
boundaries came to replicate for the most part the old ethnic 
boundaries which had formed Residencies under Dutch 
administration. North Sumatra is the principal exception. Its 
two pre-war constituents, East Sumatra and Tapanuli, were each 
so ethnically divided that a more complex multi-ethnic North 
Sumatra appeared to have fewer objections. Perhaps partly for 
similar reasons, Medan retains some ambitions to act as a focus 
for all of Sumatra (e.g. Koanda Sumatera, 1969; Meuraxa, 1974). 
The history of the PRRI rebellion only confirms the theme of 
this essay, that it has been easier for Sumatrans in modern 
times to relate to a distant government in Java than a close one 
in Sumatra. There are many advantages from a scholarly point of 
view in looking at Sumatra as a whole, but we will never be able 
to see it in isolation from its neighbours 
Sumatrans themselves have done. 
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